Review of Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy by Paul Horwich 248p (2013) (review revised 2019) by Starks, Michael
 1 
 
Review of Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy by Paul 
Horwich 248p (2013) (review revised 2019) 
 
Michael Starks 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Horwich gives a fine analysis of Wittgenstein (W) and is a leading W scholar, but 
in my view, they all fall short of a full appreciation, as I explain at length in this 
review and many others. If one does not understand W (and preferably Searle also) 
then I don't see how one could have more than a superficial understanding of 
philosophy and of higher order thought and thus of all complex behavior 
(psychology, sociology, anthropology, history, literature, society). In a nutshell, W 
demonstrated that when you have shown how a sentence is used in the context of 
interest, there is nothing more to say. I will start with a few notable quotes and then 
give what I think are the minimum considerations necessary to understand 
Wittgenstein, philosophy and human behavior. 
 
First one might note that putting “meta” in front of any word should be suspect. W 
remarked e.g., that metamathematics is mathematics like any other. The notion that 
we can step outside philosophy (i.e., the descriptive psychology of higher order 
thought) is itself a profound confusion. Another irritation here (and throughout 
academic writing for the last 4 decades) is the constant reverse linguistic sexism of 
“her” and “hers” and “she” or “he/she” etc., where “they” and “theirs” and “them” 
would do nicely. Likewise, the use of the French word 'repertoire' where the English 
'repertory' will do quite well. The major deficiency is the complete failure (though 
very common) to employ what I see as the hugely powerful and intuitive two 
systems view of HOT and Searle’s framework which I have outlined above. This is 
especially poignant in the chapter on meaning p111 et seq. (especially in footnotes 
2-7), where we swim in very muddy water without the framework of automated 
true only S1, propositional dispositional S2, COS etc. One can also get a better view 
of the inner and the outer by reading e.g., Johnston or Budd (see my reviews). 
Horwich however makes many incisive comments. I especially liked his summary 
of the import of W’s anti-theoretical stance on p65. He needs to give more emphasis 
to ‘On Certainty’, recently the subject of much effort by Daniele Moyal- Sharrock, 
Coliva and others and summarized in my recent articles. 
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Horwich is first rate and his work well worth the effort. One hopes that he (and 
everyone) will study Searle and some modern psychology as well as Hutto, Read, 
Hutchinson, Stern, Moyal-Sharrock, Stroll, Hacker and Baker etc. to attain a broad 
modern view of behavior. Most of their papers are on academia.edu and 
philpapers.org, but for PMS Hacker see 
http://info.sjc.ox.ac.uk/scr/hacker/DownloadPapers.html. 
 
He gives one of the most beautiful summaries of where an understanding of 
Wittgenstein leaves us that I have ever seen. 
 
“There must be no attempt to explain our linguistic/conceptual activity (PI 126) as 
in Frege’s reduction of arithmetic to logic; no attempt to give it epistemological 
foundations (PI 124) as in meaning based accounts of a priori knowledge; no 
attempt to characterize idealized forms of it (PI 130) as in sense logics; no attempt 
to reform it (PI 124, 132) as in Mackie’s error theory or Dummett’s intuitionism; no 
attempt to streamline it (PI 133) as in Quine’s account of existence; no attempt to 
make it more consistent (PI 132) as in Tarski’s response to the liar paradoxes; and 
no attempt to make it more complete (PI 133) as in the settling of questions of 
personal identity for bizarre hypothetical ‘teleportation’ scenarios.” 
 
Finally, let me suggest that with the perspective I have encouraged here, W is at the 
center of contemporary philosophy and psychology and is not obscure, difficult or 
irrelevant, but scintillating, profound and crystal clear and that to miss him is to 
miss one of the greatest intellectual adventures possible. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from 
the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of 
Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John 
Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking 
Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed 
Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) and Suicidal Utopian 
Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) 
 
Horwich gives a fine analysis of Wittgenstein (W) and is a leading W scholar, but 
in my view, they all fall short of a full appreciation, as I explain at length in this 
review and many others. If one does not understand W (and preferably Searle also) 
then I don’t see how one could have more than a superficial understanding of 
philosophy and of higher order thought and thus of all complex behavior 
(psychology, sociology, anthropology, history, literature, society). In a nutshell, W 
demonstrated that when you have shown how a sentence is used in the context of 
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interest, there is nothing more to say. 
I will start with a few notable quotes and then give what I think are the minimum 
considerations necessary to understand Wittgenstein, philosophy and human 
behavior. 
 
"The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling it a 
"young science"; its state is not comparable with that of physics, for instance, in its 
beginnings. (Rather with that of certain branches of mathematics. Set theory.) For 
in psychology there are experimental methods and conceptual confusion. (As in the 
other case, conceptual confusion and methods of proof). The existence of the 
experimental method makes us think we have the means of solving the problems 
that trouble us; though problem and method pass one another by." Wittgenstein (PI 
p.232) 
 
“Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are 
irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This 
tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into complete 
darkness.” (BBB p18). 
 
"But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness: nor 
do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited 
background against which I distinguish between true and false." Wittgenstein OC 
94 
 
"The aim of philosophy is to erect a wall at the point where language stops anyway."  
Wittgenstein Philosophical Occasions p187 
 
"The limit of language is shown by its being impossible to describe a fact which 
corresponds to (is the translation of) a sentence without simply repeating the 
sentence ..." Wittgenstein CV p10 
 
“If we keep in mind the possibility of a picture which, though correct, has no 
similarity with its object, the interpolation of a shadow between the sentence and 
reality loses all point. For now, the sentence itself can serve as such a shadow. The 
sentence is just such a picture, which hasn’t the slightest similarity with what it 
represents.” BBB p37 
 
“Thus, we may say of some philosophizing mathematicians that they are obviously 
not aware of the many different usages of the word “proof; and that they are not 
clear about the differences between the uses of the word “kind”, when they talk of 
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kinds of numbers, kinds of proof, as though the word “kind” here meant the same 
thing as in the context “kinds of apples.” Or, we may say, they are not aware of the 
different meanings of the word “discovery” when in one case we talk of the 
discovery of the construction of the pentagon and in the other case of the discovery 
of the South Pole.” BBB p29 
 
These quotes are not chosen at random but (along with the others in my reviews) 
are an outline of behavior (human nature) from our two greatest descriptive 
psychologists. In considering these matters we must keep in mind that philosophy 
is the descriptive psychology of higher order thought (HOT), which is another of 
the obvious facts that are totally overlooked –i.e., I have never seen it clearly stated 
anywhere. 
 
Here is how the leading Wittgenstein scholar summarized his work: “Wittgenstein 
resolved many of the deep problems that have dogged our subject for centuries, 
sometimes indeed for more than two millennia, problems about the nature of 
linguistic representation, about the relationship between thought and language, 
about solipsism and idealism, self-knowledge and knowledge of other minds, and 
about the nature of necessary truth and of mathematical propositions. He ploughed 
up the soil of European philosophy of logic and language. He gave us a novel and 
immensely fruitful array of insights into philosophy of psychology. He attempted 
to overturn centuries of reflection on the nature of mathematics and mathematical 
truth. He undermined foundationalist epistemology. And he bequeathed us a 
vision of philosophy as a contribution not to human knowledge, but to human 
understanding – understanding of the forms of our thought and of the conceptual 
confusions into which we are liable to fall.”—Peter Hacker--'Gordon Baker's late 
interpretation of Wittgenstein' 
 
I would add that W was the first (by 40 years) to clearly and extensively describe 
the two systems of thought -- fast automatic prelinguistic S1 and the slow reflective 
linguistic dispositional S2. He explained how behavior only is possible with a vast 
inherited background that is the axiomatic basis for judging and cannot be doubted 
or judged, so will (choice), consciousness, self, time and space are innate true-only 
axioms. He discussed many times what is now known as Theory of Mind, Framing 
and cognitive illusions. He frequently explained the necessity of the innate 
background and demonstrated how it generates behavior. He described the 
psychology behind what later became the Wason test--a fundamental measure used 
in EP research decades later. He noted the indeterminate nature of language and 
the game-like nature of social interaction. He examined in thousands of pages and 
hundreds of examples how our inner mental experiences are not describable in 
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language, this being possible only for public behavior with a public language (the 
impossibility of private language). Thus, he can be viewed as the first evolutionary 
psychologist. 
 
When thinking about Wittgenstein, I often recall the comment attributed to 
Cambridge Philosophy professor C.D. Broad (who did not understand nor like 
him). “Not offering the chair of philosophy to Wittgenstein would be like not 
offering the chair of physics to Einstein!" I think of him as the Einstein of intuitive 
psychology. Though born ten years later, he was likewise hatching ideas about the 
nature of reality at nearly the same time and in the same part of the world and like 
Einstein nearly died in WW1. Now suppose Einstein was a suicidal homosexual 
recluse with a difficult personality who published only one early version of his 
ideas that were confused and often mistaken, but became world famous; completely 
changed his ideas but for the next 30 years published nothing more, and knowledge 
of his new work, in mostly garbled form, diffused slowly from occasional lectures 
and students notes; that he died in 1951 leaving behind over 20,000 pages of mostly 
handwritten scribblings in German, composed of sentences or short paragraphs 
with, often, no clear relationship to sentences before or after; that he wrote in a 
Socratic style with 3 distinct persons in the dialog (actually his writings should be 
called trialogues, though I seem to be the only one to use this term)—the narrator, 
the interlocutor and the commentator (usually W’s view) whose comments were 
blended together by most readers, thus completely vitiating the whole elucidatory 
and therapeutic thrust, that these were cut and pasted from other notebooks written 
years earlier with notes in the margins, under linings and crossed out words, so that 
many sentences have multiple variants; that his literary executives cut this 
indigestible mass into pieces, leaving out what they wished and struggling with the 
monstrous task of capturing the correct meaning of sentences which were 
conveying utterly novel views of how the universe works and that they then 
published this material with agonizing slowness (not finished after half a century) 
with prefaces that contained no real explanation of what it was about; that he 
became as much notorious as famous due to many statements that all previous 
physics was a mistake and even nonsense, and that virtually nobody understood 
his work, in spite of hundreds of books and tens of thousands of papers discussing 
it; that many physicists knew only his early work in which he had made a definitive 
summation of Newtonian physics stated in such extremely abstract and condensed 
form that it was difficult to decide what was being said; that he was then virtually 
forgotten and that most books and articles on the nature of the world and the 
diverse topics of modern physics had only passing and usually erroneous 
references to him, and that many omitted him entirely; that to this day, over half a 
century after his death, there were only a handful of people who really grasped the 
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monumental consequences of what he had done. This, I claim, is precisely the 
situation with Wittgenstein. 
 
Before remarking on this book, I will first offer some comments on philosophy and 
its relationship to contemporary psychological research as exemplified in the works 
of Searle (S), Wittgenstein (W), Hacker (H) et al. It will help to see my reviews of 
PNC (Philosophy in a New Century), TLP, PI, OC, Making the Social World (MSW) 
and other books by and about these geniuses, who provide a clear description of 
higher order behavior not found in psychology books, that I will refer to as the WS 
framework. A major theme in all discussion of human behavior is the need to 
separate the genetically programmed automatisms from the effects of culture. All 
study of higher order behavior is an effort to tease apart not only fast S1 and slow 
S2 thinking --e.g., perceptions and other automatisms vs. dispositions, but the 
extensions of S2 into culture (S3). Searle's work as a whole provides a stunning 
description of higher order S2/S3 social behavior, while the later W shows how it is 
based on true-only unconscious axioms of S1 which evolved into conscious 
dispositional propositional thinking of S2. 
 
S1 is the simple automated functions of our involuntary, System 1, fast thinking, 
mirror neuron, true-only, non-propositional, prelinguistic mental states- our 
perceptions and memories and reflexive acts including System 1 Truths and UA1 -
-Understanding of Agency 1-- and Emotions1- such as joy, love, anger) which can 
be described causally, while the evolutionarily later linguistic functions are 
expressions or descriptions of voluntary, System 2, slow thinking, mentalizing 
neurons. That is, of testable true or false, propositional, Truth2 and UA2 and 
Emotions2 (joyfulness, loving, hating) -- the dispositional (and often counterfactual) 
imagining, supposing, intending, thinking, knowing, believing, etc. which can only 
be described in terms of reasons (i.e., it's just a fact that attempts to describe System 
2 in terms of neurochemistry, atomic physics, mathematics, make no sense--see W, 
S, Hacker etc.). 
 
“Many words then in this sense then don’t have a strict meaning. But this is not a 
defect. To think it is would be like saying that the light of my reading lamp is no 
real light at all because it has no sharp boundary.” BBB p27 
 
“The origin and the primitive form of the language game is a reaction; only from 
this can more complicated forms develop. Language--I want to say--is a refinement. 
‘In the beginning was the deed.’” CV p31 
 
“Imagine a person whose memory could not retain what the word ‘pain’ meant-so 
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that he constantly called different things by that name-but nevertheless used the 
word in a way fitting in with the usual symptoms and presuppositions of the word 
‘pain’-in short he used it as we all do.” 
PI p271 
 
“Every sign is capable of interpretation but the meaning mustn’t be capable of 
interpretation. Is is the last interpretation” BBB p34 
 
“There is a kind of general disease of thinking which always looks for (and finds) 
what would be called a mental state from which all our acts spring, as from a 
reservoir.” BBB p143 
 
“And the mistake which we here and in a thousand similar cases are inclined to 
make is labeled by the word “to make” as we have used it in the sentence “It is no 
act of insight which makes us use the rule as we do”, because there is an idea that 
“something must make us” do what we do. And this again joins onto the confusion 
between cause and reason. We need have no reason to follow the rule as we do. The 
chain of reasons has an end.” BBB p143 
 
Disposition words have at least two basic uses. One is a peculiar philosophical use 
(but graduating into everyday uses) which refers to the true-only sentences 
resulting from direct perceptions and memory, i.e., our innate axiomatic S1 
psychology (`I know these are my hands')--i.e., they are Causally Self Referential 
(CSR)-called reflexive or intransitive in BBB), and the S2 use, which is their normal 
use as dispositions, which can be acted out, and which can become true or false (`I 
know my way home')--i.e., they have Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) and are not 
CSR (called transitive in BBB). 
 
It follows both from W's 3rd period work and from contemporary psychology, that 
`will', `self' and `consciousness' are axiomatic true-only elements of S1 composed of 
perceptions and reflexes., and there is no possibility (intelligibility) of 
demonstrating (of giving sense to) their falsehood. As W made so wonderfully clear 
numerous times, they are the basis for judgment and so cannot be judged. The true-
only axioms of our psychology are not evidential. 
 
Evolution by inclusive fitness has programmed the unconscious rapid reflexive 
causal actions of S1 which often give rise to the conscious slow thinking of S2 (often 
modified into the cultural extensions of S3), which produces reasons for action that 
often result in activation of body and/or speech muscles by S1 causing actions. The 
general mechanism is via both neurotransmission and by changes in 
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neuromodulators in targeted areas of the brain. The overall cognitive illusion 
(called by S `The Phenomenological Illusion', by Pinker `The Blank Slate' and by 
Tooby and Cosmides `The Standard Social Science Model') is that S2/S3 has 
generated the action consciously for reasons of which we are fully aware and in 
control of, but anyone familiar with modern biology and psychology can see that 
this view is not credible. 
 
A sentence expresses a thought (has a meaning), when it has clear COS, i.e., public 
truth conditions. Hence the comment from W: " When I think in language, there 
aren't `meanings' going through my mind in addition to the verbal expressions: the 
language is itself the vehicle of thought." And, if I think with or without words, the 
thought is whatever I (honestly) say it is as there is no other possible criterion (COS). 
Thus, W's lovely aphorisms (p132 Budd) "It is in language that wish and fulfillment 
meet" and "Like everything metaphysical, the harmony between thought and 
reality is to be found in the grammar of the language." And one might note here 
that `grammar' in W can usually be translated as EP and that in spite of his frequent 
warnings against theorizing and generalizing, this is about as broad a 
characterization of higher order descriptive psychology (philosophy) as one can 
find. 
 
Though W is correct that there is no mental state that constitutes meaning, S notes 
that there is a general way to characterize the act of meaning-- "Speaker meaning... 
is the imposition of conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction" which 
means to speak or write a well-formed sentence expressing COS in a context that 
can be true or false and this is an act and not a mental state. 
 
Hence the famous quote from W: "If God had looked into our minds he would not 
have been able to see there whom we were speaking of (PI p217)" and his comments 
that the whole problem of representation is contained in "that's Him" and "...what 
gives the image its interpretation is the path on which it lies," or as S says its COS. 
Hence W's summation (p140 Budd) that "What it always comes to in the end is that 
without any further meaning, he calls what happened the wish that that should 
happen"..." the question whether I know what I wish before my wish is fulfilled 
cannot arise at all. And the fact that some event stops my wishing does not mean 
that it fulfills it. Perhaps I should not have been satisfied if my wish had been 
satisfied"...Suppose it were asked `Do I know what I long for before I get it? If I have 
learned to talk, then I do know." 
 
Wittgenstein (W) is for me easily the most brilliant thinker on human behavior. He 
shows that behavior is an extension of innate true-only axioms (see “On Certainty” 
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for his final extended treatment of this idea) and that our conscious ratiocination 
emerges from unconscious machinations. His corpus can be seen as the foundation 
for all description of animal behavior, revealing how the mind works and indeed 
must work. The “must” is entailed by the fact that all brains share a common 
ancestry and common genes and so there is only one basic way they work, that this 
necessarily has an axiomatic structure, that all higher animals share the same 
evolved psychology based on inclusive fitness, and that in humans this is extended 
into a personality based on throat muscle contractions (language) that evolved to 
manipulate others. I suggest it will prove of the greatest value to consider W’s work 
and most of his examples as an effort to tease apart not only fast and slow thinking 
(e.g., perceptions vs dispositions-- see below), but nature and nurture. 
 
“Philosophy simply puts everything before us and neither explains nor deduces 
anything…One might give the name ‘philosophy’ to what is possible before all new 
discoveries and inventions.” PI 126 
 
“The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the conflict 
between it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, 
not a result of investigation: it was a requirement.)” PI 107 
 
“The wrong conception which I want to object to in this connexion is the following, 
that we can discover something wholly new. That is a mistake.  The truth of the 
matter is that we have already got everything, and that we have got it actually 
present; we need not wait for anything. We make our moves in the realm of the 
grammar of our ordinary language, and this grammar is already there. Thus, we 
have already got everything and need not wait for the future.” (said in 1930) 
Waismann “Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle (1979) p183 
 
“Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in 
philosophical investigation: the difficulty---I might say---is not that of finding the 
solution but rather that of recognizing as the solution something that looks as if it 
were only a preliminary to it. We have already said everything. ---Not anything that 
follows from this, no this itself is the solution! ….This is connected, I believe, with 
our wrongly expecting an explanation, whereas the solution of the difficulty is a 
description, if we give it the right place in our considerations.  If we dwell upon it, 
and do not try to   get beyond it.”  Zettel p312-314 
 
“Our method is purely descriptive, the descriptions we give are not hints of 
explanations.” BBB p125 
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“For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But this simply 
means that the philosophical problems should completely disappear.” PI p133 
 
W can also be regarded as a pioneer in evolutionary cognitive linguistics—the Top 
Down analysis of the mind and its evolution via the careful analysis of examples of 
language use in context, exposing the many varieties of language games and the 
relationships between the primary games of true-only unconscious, axiomatic fast 
thinking of perception, memory and reflexive emotions and acts (often described as 
the subcortical and primitive cortical reptilian brain first-self functions), and the 
later evolved higher cortical dispositional conscious abilities of believing, knowing, 
thinking etc. that constitute the true or false propositional secondary language 
games of slow thinking that include the network of cognitive illusions that 
constitute the basis of our second-self personality. He dissects hundreds of 
language games showing how the true-only perceptions, memories and reflexive 
actions of system one (S1) grade into the thinking, remembering, and 
understanding of system two (S2) dispositions, and many of his examples also 
address the nature/nurture issue explicitly. With this evolutionary perspective, his 
later works are a breathtaking revelation of human nature that is entirely current 
and has never been equaled. Many perspectives have heuristic value, but I find that 
this evolutionary two systems view is the best. To paraphrase Dobzhansky’s 
famous comment: “Nothing in philosophy makes sense except in the light of 
evolutionary psychology.” 
 
The common ideas (e.g., the subtitle of one of Pinker’s books “The Stuff of Thought: 
language as a window into human nature”) that language is a window on or some 
sort of translation of our thinking or even (Fodor) that there must be some other 
“Language of Thought” of which it is a translation, were rejected by W, who tried 
to show, with hundreds of continually reanalyzed perspicacious examples of 
language in action, that language is not just the best picture we can ever get of 
thinking, the mind and human nature, but speech is the mind, and his whole corpus 
can be regarded as the development of this idea. He rejected the idea that the 
Bottom Up approaches of physiology, experimental psychology and computation 
(Computational Theory of Mind, Strong AI, Dynamic Systems Theory, 
functionalism, etc.) could reveal what his analyses of Language Games (LG’s) did. 
The difficulties he noted are to understand what is always in front of our eyes and 
to capture vagueness (“The greatest difficulty in these investigations is to find a way 
of representing vagueness” LWPP1, 347). 
 
He recognized that ‘Nothing is Hidden’—i.e., our whole psychology and all the 
answers to all philosophical questions are here in our language (our life) and that 
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the difficulty is not to find the answers but to recognize them as always here in front 
of us—we just have to stop trying to look deeper and to abandon the myth of 
introspective access to our “inner life” (e.g., “The greatest danger here is wanting to 
observe oneself.” LWPP1, 459). 
 
Incidentally, the equation of logic or grammar and our axiomatic psychology is 
essential to understanding W and human nature (as DMS, but afaik nobody else, 
points out). 
 
"Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the reach 
of phenomenology because they have no immediate phenomenological reality... 
Because the creation of meaningfulness out of meaninglessness is not consciously 
experienced...it does not exist...This is... the phenomenological illusion." Searle PNC 
p115-117 
 
"...the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do with 
conditions of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can stand in an 
intentional relation to the world, and since those intentional relations always 
determine conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition is defined as anything 
sufficient to determine conditions of satisfaction, it turns out that all intentionality 
is a matter of propositions." Searle PNC p193 
 
"The intentional state represents its conditions of satisfaction...people erroneously 
suppose that every mental representation must be consciously thought...but the 
notion of a representation as I am using it is a functional and not an ontological 
notion. Anything that has conditions of satisfaction, that can succeed or fail in a way 
that is characteristic of intentionality, is by definition a representation of its 
conditions of satisfaction...we can analyze the structure of the intentionality of 
social phenomena by analyzing their conditions of satisfaction." Searle MSW p28-
32 
 
“Superstition is nothing but belief in the causal nexus.”  TLP 5.1361 
 
"Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the 
activities of the mind lie open before us." BBB p6 
 
“We feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, the 
problems of life remain completely untouched. Of course, there are then no 
questions left, and this itself is the answer.”  TLP 6.52 
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“Nonsense, Nonsense, because you are making assumptions instead of simply 
describing. If your head is haunted by explanations here, you are neglecting to 
remind yourself of the most important facts.” Z 220 
 
Our shared public experience becomes a true-only extension of our axiomatic EP 
and cannot be found mistaken without threatening our sanity. That is, the 
consequences of an S1 ‘mistake’ are quite different from an S2 mistake. A corollary, 
nicely explained by DMS and elucidated in his own unique manner by Searle, is 
that the skeptical view of the world and other minds (and a mountain of other 
nonsense including the Blank Slate) cannot really get a foothold, as “reality” is the 
result of involuntary axioms and not testable true or false propositions. 
 
The investigation of involuntary fast thinking has revolutionized psychology, 
economics (e.g., Kahneman’s Nobel prize) and other disciplines under names like 
“cognitive illusions”, “priming”, “framing”, “heuristics” and “biases”. Of course 
these too are language games, so there will be more and less useful ways to use 
these words, and studies and discussions will vary from “pure” System 1 to 
combinations of 1 and 2 (the norm as W made clear), but presumably not ever of 
slow System 2 dispositional thinking only, since any System 2 thought or 
intentional action cannot occur without involving much of the intricate network of 
“cognitive modules”, “inference engines”,“intracerebral reflexes”, “automatisms”, 
“cognitive axioms”, “background” or “bedrock” (as W and later Searle call our EP). 
One of W’s recurring themes was TOM, or as I prefer UA (Understanding of 
Agency). Ian Apperly, who is carefully analyzing UA1 and UA2 in experiments, has 
recently become aware of Hutto, who has characterized UA1 as a fantasy (i.e., no 
‘Theory’ nor representation involved in UA1--that being reserved for UA2—see my 
review of his book with Myin). However, like other psychologists, Apperly has no 
idea W laid the groundwork for this 80 years ago. It is an easily defensible view that 
the core of the burgeoning literature on cognitive illusions, automatisms and higher 
order thought is compatible with and straightforwardly deducible from W. In spite 
of the fact that most of the above has been known to many for decades (and even ¾ 
of a century in the case of some of W’s teachings), I have never seen anything 
approaching an adequate discussion in behavioral science texts and commonly 
there is barely a mention. 
 
Now that we have a reasonable start on the Logical Structure of Rationality (the 
Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought) laid out we can look at the table 
of Intentionality that results from this work, which I have constructed over the last 
few years. It is based on a much simpler one from Searle, which in turn owes much 
to Wittgenstein. I have also incorporated in modified form tables being used by 
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current researchers in the psychology of thinking processes which are evidenced in 
the last 9 rows. It should prove interesting to compare it with those in Peter Hacker’s 
3 recent volumes on Human Nature. I offer this table as an heuristic for describing 
behavior that I find more complete and useful than any other framework I have 
seen and not as a final or complete analysis, which would have to be three 
dimensional with hundreds (at least) of arrows going in many directions with many 
(perhaps all) pathways between S1 and S2 being bidirectional. Also, the very 
distinction between S1 and S2, cognition and willing, perception and memory, 
between feeling, knowing, believing and expecting etc. are arbitrary--that is, as W 
demonstrated, all words are contextually sensitive and most have several utterly 
different uses (meanings or COS). Many complex charts have been published by 
scientists but I find them of minimal utility when thinking about behavior (as 
opposed to thinking about brain function). Each level of description may be useful 
in certain contexts but I find that being coarser or finer limits usefulness. 
 
The Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR), or the Logical Structure of Mind (LSM), 
the Logical Structure of Behavior (LSB), the Logical Structure of Thought (LST), the 
Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), the Logical Structure of Personality 
(LSP), the Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness (DSC), the Descriptive 
Psychology of Higher Order Thought (DPHOT), Intentionality-the classical 
philosophical term. 
 
System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking 
(Cognition) has no gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2 and Willing 
(Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle). 
 
I suggest we can describe behavior more clearly by changing Searle’s “impose 
conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” to “relate mental states to 
the world by moving muscles”—i.e., talking, writing and doing, and his “mind to 
world direction of fit” and “world to mind direction of fit” by “cause originates in 
the mind” and “cause originates in the world”   S1 is only upwardly causal (world 
to mind) and contentless (lacking representations or information) while S2 has 
content and is downwardly causal (mind to world). I have adopted my 
terminology in this table. 
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 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/
Word 
Cause Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public Conditions 
of Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe    
 A Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change Intensity No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place 
(H+N, T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in Body No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
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Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 Disposition* 
 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs Working 
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
 
 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and others as 
COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by myself), while the 
automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by others (or COS1 by 
myself). 
* Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible 
actions etc. 
**         Searle’s  Prior Intentions 
***       Searle’s Intention In Action 
****     Searle’s Direction of Fit 
*****   Searle’s Direction of Causation 
****** (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly called this 
causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive systems. 
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******** Here and Now or There and Then 
 
One should always keep in mind Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have 
described the possible uses (meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of Satisfaction) of 
language in a particular context, we have exhausted its interest, and attempts at 
explanation (i.e., philosophy) only get us further away from the truth. It is critical 
to note that this table is only a highly simplified context-free heuristic and each use 
of a word must be examined in its context. The best examination of context variation 
is in Peter Hacker’s recent 3 volumes on Human Nature, which provide numerous 
tables and charts that should be compared with this one. Those wishing a 
comprehensive up to date account of Wittgenstein, Searle and their analysis of 
behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book The Logical 
Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in 
Wittgenstein and Searle 2nd ed (2019). 
 
EXPLANATION OF THE TABLE System 1 (i.e., emotions, memory, perceptions, 
reflexes) which parts of the brain present to consciousness, are automated and 
generally happening in less than 500msec, while System 2 are abilities to perform 
slow deliberative actions tha t are represented in consciousness (S2D-my 
terminology) requiring over 500msec, but frequently repeated S2 actions can also 
become automated (S2A-my terminology). There is a gradation of consciousness 
from coma through the stages of sleep to full awareness. Memory includes short 
term memory (working memory) of system 2 and long term memory of System 1. 
For volitions one would usually say they are successful   or not, rather than T or F. 
 
Of course, the various rows and columns are logically and psychologically 
connected. E.G., Emotion, Memory and Perception in the True or False row will be 
True only, will describe a mental state, belong to cognitive system 1, will not 
generally be initiated voluntarily, are causally self reflexive, cause originates in the 
world and causes changes in the mind, have a precise duration, change in intensity, 
occur here and now, commonly have a special quality, do not need language, are 
independent of general intelligence and working memory, are not inhibited by 
cognitive loading, will not have voluntary content, and will not have public  
conditions of satisfaction etc. 
 
There will always be ambiguities because the words cannot precisely match the 
actual complex functions of the brain (behavior), that is, there is a combinatorial 
explosion of contexts (in sentences and in the world), and this is why it’s not 
possible to reduce higher order behavior to a system of laws which would have to   
state all the possible contexts –hence Wittgenstein’s warnings against theories. 
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About a million years ago primates evolved the ability to use their throat muscles 
to make complex series of noises (i.e., primitive speech) to describe present events 
(perceptions, memory, reflexive actions and some Primary or Primitive Language 
Games (PLG’s). System 1 is comprised of fast,automated, subcortical, 
nonrepresentational, causally self-referential, intransitive, informationless, true-
only mental states with a precise time and location) and over time there evolved in 
higher cortical S2 with the further ability to describe displacements in space and 
time (conditionals, hypotheticals or fictionals) of potential events (the past and 
future and often counterfactual, conditional or fictional preferences, inclinations or 
dispositions -the Secondary or Sophisticated Language Games (SLG’s) of System 2 
slow, cortical, conscious, information containing, transitive (having public 
Conditions of Satisfaction-Searle’s term for truthmakers or meaning which I divide 
into COS1 and COS2 for private S1 and public S2), representational—which I again 
divide into R1 for S1 representations and R2 for S2) ,true or false propositional 
attitudinal thinking, with all S2 functions having no precise time and being abilities 
and not mental states. Preferences are Intuitions, Tendencies, Automatic 
Ontological Rules, Behaviors, Abilities, Cognitive Modules, Personality Traits, 
Templates, Inference Engines, Inclinations, Emotions, Propositional Attitudes, 
Appraisals, Capacities, Hypotheses. Some Emotions are slowly developing and 
changing results of S2 dispositions (W RPP2 148) while others are typical S1—fast 
and automatic to appear and disappear. “I believe”, “he loves”, “they think” are 
descriptions of possible public acts typically displaced in spacetime. My first-person 
statements about myself are true-only (excluding lying) –i.e. S1, while third person 
statements about others are true or false –i.e., S2 (see my reviews of Johnston 
‘Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner’ and of Budd ‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of 
Psychology’). 
 
“Preferences” as a class of intentional states --opposed to perceptions, reflexive acts 
and memories-- were first clearly described by Wittgenstein (W) in the   1930’s and 
termed “inclinations” or “dispositions”. They have commonly been termed 
“propositional attitudes” since Russell but this is a misleading phrase since 
believing, intending, knowing, remembering etc., are often not propositions nor 
attitudes, as has been shown e.g., by W and by Searle (e.g., cf. Consciousness and 
Language p118). They are intrinsic, observer independent public representations 
(as opposed to presentations or representations of System 1 to System 2 – Searle-
C+L p53).  They are potential acts displaced in time or space while the evolutionarily 
more primitive S1 perceptions memories and reflexive actions are always here and 
now. This is one way to characterize System 2 -the second major advance in 
vertebrate psychology after System 1—the ability to represent events and to think 
of them as occurring in another place or time (Searle’s third faculty of counterfactual 
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imagination supplementing cognition and volition). S1 ‘thoughts’ are potential or 
unconscious mental states of S1 --Searle-- Phil Issues 1:45- 66 (1991). 
 
Perceptions, memories and reflexive (automatic) actions can be described as S1 or 
primary LG’s (PLG’s -- e.g., I see the dog) and there are, in the normal case, NO 
TESTS possible so they can be True Only. 
 
Dispositions can be described as secondary LG’s (SLG’s –e.g. I believe I see the dog) 
and must also be acted out, even for me in my own case (i.e., how do I KNOW what 
I believe, think, feel until I act or some event occurs—see my reviews of Johnston 
‘Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner’ and Budd ‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of 
Psychology’). Note well that Dispositions also become Actions when spoken or 
written as well as being acted out in other ways, and these ideas are all due to 
Wittgenstein (mid 1930’s) and are NOT Behaviorism (Hintikka & Hintikka 1981, 
Searle, Hacker, Hutto etc.,). 
 
Wittgenstein can be regarded as the founder of evolutionary psychology and his 
work a unique investigation of the functioning of our axiomatic System 1 
psychology and its interaction with System 2. After Wittgenstein laid the 
groundwork for the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought in the Blue 
and Brown Books in the early 30’s, it was extended by John Searle, who made a 
simpler version of this table in his classic book Rationality in Action (2001). It 
expands on W’s survey of the axiomatic structure of evolutionary psychology 
developed from his very first comments in 1911 and so beautifully laid out in his 
last work On Certainty (OC) (written in 1950-51).  OC is the foundation stone of 
behavior or epistemology and ontology (arguably the same), cognitive linguistics 
or Higher Order Thought, and in my view the single most important work in 
philosophy (descriptive psychology) and thus in the study of behavior. Perception, 
Memory, Reflexive actions and Emotion are primitive partly Subcortical 
Involuntary Mental States, that can be described in PLG’s, in which the mind 
automatically fits the world (is Causally Self Referential--Searle) --the 
unquestionable, true only, axiomatic basis of rationality over which no control is 
possible). Preferences, Desires, and Intentions are descriptions of slow thinking 
conscious Voluntary Abilities—that can be described in SLG’s-- in which the mind 
tries to fit the world. Behaviorism and all the other confusions of our default 
descriptive psychology (philosophy) arise because we cannot see S1 working and 
describe all actions as SLG’s (The Phenomenological Illusion— TPI—Searle). W 
understood this and described it with unequalled clarity with hundreds of 
examples of language (the mind) in action throughout his works. Reason has access 
to memory and so we use consciously apparent but often incorrect reasons to 
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explain behavior (the Two Selves or Systems or Processes of current research). 
Beliefs and other Dispositions can be described as thoughts which try to match the 
facts of the world (mind to world direction of fit), while Volitions are intentions to 
act (Prior Intentions—PI, or Intentions In Action-IA-Searle) plus acts which try to 
match the world to the thoughts—world to mind direction of fit—cf. Searle e.g., C+L   
p145, 190). 
 
Sometimes there are gaps in reasoning to arrive at belief and other dispositions. 
Disposition words can be used as nouns which seem to describe mental states (‘my 
thought is…’) or as verbs or adjectives to describe abilities (agents as they act or 
might act - ‘I think that…) and are often incorrectly called “Propositional 
Attitudes”. Perceptions become Memories and our innate programs (cognitive 
modules, templates, inference engines of S1) use these to produce Dispositions — 
(believing, knowing, understanding, thinking, etc., -actual or potential PUBLIC 
ACTS (language, thought, mind) also called Inclinations, Preferences, Capabilities, 
Representations of S2) and Volition -and there is no language (concept, thought) of 
PRIVATE mental states for thinking or willing (i.e., no private language, thought or 
mind). Higher animals can think and will acts and to that extent they have a public 
psychology. 
 
PERCEPTIONS: (“X” is True): Hear, See, Smell, Pain, Touch, temperature 
Memories:  Remembering, Dreaming? 
 
PREFERENCES, INCLINATIONS, DISPOSITIONS (X might become True): 
 
CLASS 1: PROPOSITIONAL(True or False) PUBLIC ACTS of Believing, Judging, 
Thinking, Representing, Understanding, Choosing, Deciding, Preferring, 
Interpreting, Knowing (including skills and abilities), Attending (Learning), 
Experiencing, Meaning, Remembering, Intending, Considering, Desiring, 
expecting, wishing, wanting, hoping (a special class), Seeing As (Aspects), 
 
CLASS 2: DECOUPLED MODE-(as if, conditional, hypothetical, fictional) - 
Dreaming, Imagining, Lying, Predicting, Doubting 
 
CLASS 3: EMOTIONS: Loving, Hating, Fearing, Sorrow, Joy, Jealousy, Depression. 
Their function is to modulate Preferences to increase inclusive fitness (expected 
maximum utility) by facilitating information processing of perceptions and 
memories for rapid action. There is some separation between S1 emotions such as 
rage and fear and S2 such as love, hate, disgust and anger. 
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DESIRES: (I want “X” to be True—I want to change the world to fit my thoughts): 
Longing, Hoping, Expecting, Awaiting, Needing, Requiring, obliged to do 
INTENTIONS: (I will make “X” True) Intending 
 
ACTIONS (I am making “X” True) : Acting, Speaking , Reading, Writing, 
Calculating, Persuading, Showing, Demonstrating, Convincing, Doing Trying, 
Attempting, Laughing, Playing, Eating, Drinking, Crying, Asserting(describing, 
teaching, predicting, reporting), Promising , Making or Using Maps, Books, 
Drawings, Computer Programs –these are Public and Voluntary and transfer 
Information to others so they dominate over the Unconscious, Involuntary and 
Informationless S1 reflexes in explanations of  behavior. 
 
WORDS EXPRESS POTENTIAL ACTIONS HAVING VARIOUS FUNCTIONS IN OUR LIFE AND ARE 
NOT THE NAMES OF OBJECTS NOR OF A SINGLE TYPE OF EVENT. 
 
The social interactions of humans are governed by cognitive modules—roughly 
equivalent to the scripts or schemata of social psychology (groups of neurons 
organized into inference engines), which, with perceptions and memories, lead to 
the formation of preferences which lead to intentions and then to actions. 
Intentionality or intentional psychology can be taken to be all these processes or 
only preferences leading to actions and in the broader sense is the subject of 
cognitive psychology or cognitive neurosciences when including neurophysiology, 
neurochemistry and neurogenetics. Evolutionary psychology can be regarded as 
the study of all the preceding functions or of the operation of the modules which 
produce behavior, and is then coextensive in evolution, development and 
individual action with preferences, intentions and actions. Since the axioms 
(algorithms or cognitive modules) of our psychology are in our genes, we can
 enlarge our understanding by giving clear descriptions of how they work 
and can extend them (culture) via biology, psychology, philosophy (descriptive 
psychology), math, logic, physics, and computer programs, thus making them 
faster and more efficient. Hajek (2003) gives an analysis of dispositions as 
conditional probabilities which are algorithmatized by Rott (1999), Spohn etc. 
 
Intentionality (cognitive or evolutionary psychology) consists of various aspects of 
behavior which are innately programmed into cognitive modules which create and 
require consciousness, will and self and in normal human adults nearly all except 
perceptions and some memories are purposive, require public acts (e.g., language), 
and commit us to relationships in order to increase our inclusive fitness (maximum 
expected utility--Bayesian utility maximization but Bayesianism is highly 
questionable) via dominance and reciprocal altruism (Desire Independent Reasons 
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for Action-Searle- which I divide into DIRA1 and DIRA2 for S1 and S2) and impose 
Conditions of Satisfaction on Conditions of Satisfaction -Searle-(i.e., relate thoughts 
to the world via public acts ( muscle movements –i.e., math, language, art, music, 
sex, sports etc.). The basics of this were figured out by our greatest natural 
psychologist Ludwig Wittgenstein from the 1930’s to 1951 but with clear 
foreshadowings back to 1911, and with refinements by many, but above all by John 
Searle beginning in the 1960’s. “The general tree of psychological phenomena. I 
strive not for exactness but for a view of the whole.” RPP Vol 1 p895 cf Z p464. Much 
of intentionality (i.e., of our language games) admits of degrees. As W noted, 
inclinations are sometimes conscious and deliberative. All our templates (functions, 
concepts, language games) have fuzzy edges in some contexts as they must to be 
useful. There are at least two types of thinking (i.e., two language games or ways of 
using the dispositional verb “thinking“)— nonrational without awareness and 
rational with partial awareness (W), now described as the fast and slow thinking of 
S1 and S2. It is useful to regard these as language games and not as mere 
phenomena (W RPP Vol2 p129). Mental phenomena (our subjective or internal 
“experiences”) are epiphenomenal, lack criteria, hence lack info even for oneself 
and thus can play no role in communication, thinking or mind. Thinking like all 
dispositions (inclinations, propositional attitudes) lacks any test, is not a mental 
state (unlike perceptions of S1), and contains no information until it becomes a 
public act in speech, writing or other muscular contractions. Our perceptions and 
memories can have information (meaning-i.e., a public COS) only when they are 
manifested in public actions, for only then do thinking, feeling etc. have any 
meaning (consequences) even for ourselves. 
 
(Memory and perception are integrated by modules into dispositions which become 
psychologically effective when they are acted upon). Developing language means 
manifesting the innate ability to substitute words for acts. TOM (Theory of Mind) 
is much better called UA-Understanding of Agency –my term-and UA1 and UA2 
for such functions in S1 and S2) –and can also be called Evolutionary Psychology or 
Intentionality--the innate genetically programmed production of consciousness, 
self, and thought which leads to intentions and then to actions by contracting 
muscles.  Thus, “propositional attitude” is a confusing term for normal intuitive 
rational S2D or nonrational automated S2A speech and action. We see that the 
efforts of cognitive science to understand thinking, emotions etc. by studying 
neurophysiology is not going to tell us anything more about how the MIND 
(thought, language) works (as opposed to how the BRAIN works) than we already 
know, because “mind” (thought, language) is already in full public view (W). Any 
phenomena that are hidden in neurophysiology, biochemistry, genetics, quantum 
mechanics, or string theory, are as irrelevant to our social life as the fact that a table 
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is composed of atoms which “obey” (can be described by) the laws of physics and 
chemistry is to having lunch on it. As W so famously said “Nothing is hidden”. 
Everything of interest about the mind (thought, language) is open to view if we only 
examine carefully the workings of language. Language (mind, public speech 
connected to potential actions) was evolved to facilitate social interaction and thus 
the gathering of resources, survival and reproduction. It’s grammar (i.e., 
evolutionary psychology, intentionality) functions automatically and is extremely 
confusing when we try to analyze it. Words and sentences have multiple uses 
depending on context. I believe and I eat have profoundly different roles as do I 
believe and I believed or I believe and he believes. The present tense first person 
expressive use of inclinational verbs such as “I believe” describe my ability to 
predict my probable acts and are not descriptive of my mental state nor based on 
knowledge or information in the usual sense of those words (W).  It does not 
describe a truth but makes itself true in the act of saying it --i.e., “I believe it’s 
raining” makes itself true. That is, disposition verbs used in first person present 
tense are causally self-referential--they instantiate themselves, but as descriptions 
of possible states they are not testable (i.e., not T or F). However past or future tense 
or third person use--“I believed” or “he believes” or “he will believe’ contain 
information that is true or false as they describe public acts that are or can become 
verifiable. Likewise, “I believe it’s raining” has no information apart from 
subsequent actions, even for me, but “I believe it will rain” or “he will think it’s 
raining” are potentially verifiable public acts displaced in spacetime that intend to 
convey information (or misinformation). 
 
Nonreflective or Nonrational (automatic) words spoken without Prior Intent 
(which I call S2A—i.e., S2D automated by practice) have been called Words as 
Deeds by W & then by Daniel Moyal-Sharrock in her paper in Philosophical 
Psychology in 2000) Many so-called 
Inclinations/Dispositions/Preferences/Tendencies/Capacities/Abilities are Non-
Propositional (Non-Reflective) Attitudes (far more useful to call them functions or 
abilities) of System 1 (Tversky and Kahnemann). Prior Intentions are stated by 
Searle to be Mental States and hence S1 but again I think one must separate PI1 and 
PI2, since in our normal language our prior intentions are the conscious 
deliberations of S2. Perceptions, Memories, type 2 Dispositions (e.g., some 
emotions) and many Type 1 Dispositions are better called Reflexes of S1 and are 
automatic, nonreflective, NON -Propositional and NON-Attitudinal functioning of 
the hinges (axioms, algorithms) of our Evolutionary Psychology (Moyal-Sharrock 
after Wittgenstein). 
 
Now for some comments on Horwich’s “Wittgenstein’s Metaphilosophy”. 
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After the above and my many reviews of books by and about W, S, Hacker, DMS 
etc., it should be clear what W is doing and what a contemporary account of 
behavior should include, so I’ll make just a few comments. 
 
Firs,t one might note that putting “meta” in front of any word should be suspect. W 
remarked e.g., that metamathematics is mathematics like any other. The notion that 
we can step outside philosophy (i.e., the descriptive psychology of higher order 
thought) is itself a profound confusion. Another irritation here (and throughout 
academic writing for the last 4 decades) is the constant reverse linguistic sexism of 
“her” and “hers” and “she” or “he/she” etc., where “they” and “theirs” and “them” 
would do nicely. The major deficiency is the complete failure (though nearly 
universal except for my work) to employ what I see as the hugely powerful and 
intuitive two systems view of HOT and Searle’s framework which I have outlined 
above. This is especially poignant in the chapter on meaning p111 et seq. (especially 
in footnotes 2-7), where we swim in very muddy water without the framework of 
automated true only S1, propositional dispositional S2, COS etc. One can also get a 
better view of the inner and the outer by reading e.g., Johnston or Budd (see my 
reviews). Horwich however makes many incisive comments. I especially liked his 
summary of the import of W’s antitheoretical stance on p65. 
 
“There must be no attempt to explain our linguistic/conceptual activity (PI 126) as 
in Frege’s reduction of arithmetic to logic; no attempt to give it epistemological 
foundations (PI 124) as in meaning based accounts of a priori knowledge; no 
attempt to characterize idealized forms of it (PI 130) as in sense logics; no attempt 
to reform it (PI 124, 132) as in Mackie’s error theory or Dummett’s intuitionism; no 
attempt to streamline it (PI 133) as in Quine’s account of existence; no attempt to 
make it more consistent (PI 132) as in Tarski’s response to the liar paradoxes; and 
no attempt to make it more complete (PI 133) as in the settling of questions of 
personal identity for bizarre hypothetical ‘teleportation’ scenarios.” 
 
For me, the high points of all writing on W are nearly always the quotes from the 
master himself and this is again true here. His quote (p101) from TLP shows W’s 
early grasp of EP which he later termed the 
‘background’ or ‘bedrock’. 
 
“Thought is surrounded by a halo. Its essence, logic, presents an order, in fact the a 
priori order of the world: that is the order of possibilities, which must be common 
to both world and thought. But this order, it seems, must be utterly simple. It is 
prior to all experience, must run through all experience; no empirical cloudiness or 
uncertainty can be allowed to affect it. It must rather be of the purest crystal. But 
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this crystal does not appear as an abstraction; but as something concrete, indeed, as 
the most concrete, as it were, the hardest thing there is. (TLP # 5, 5563, PI 97).” 
 
There are many good points in the chapter on Kripke but some confusions as well. 
The discussion of W’s refutation of private language on p165-6 seems a bit unclear 
but on p 196-7 he states it again—and this notion is not only central to W but to all 
understanding of HOT. Stern has perhaps the best discussion of it I have seen in his 
“Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations”. Kripke, in spite of all the noise he 
made, is now generally understood to have totally misconstrued W, merely 
repeating the classic skeptical metaphysical blunders.  
 
Those who want to dig into ‘Kripkenstein’, or philosophy generally, should read 
“Kripke’s Conjuring Trick” by Read and Sharrock—a superb deconstruction of 
skepticism that, like most academic books and papers are now freely available on 
the net on libgen.io, b-ok.org, philpapers.org, academia.edu, arxiv.org and 
researchgate.net. 
 
I find the chapter on consciousness very good, especially p190 et. seq. on private 
language, qualia, inverted spectra and the umpteenth refutation of the idea that W 
is a behaviorist. 
 
It is worth repeating his final remark. “What sort of progress is this—the fascinating 
mystery has been removed-- yet no depths have been plumbed in consolation; 
nothing has been explained or discovered or reconceived. How tame and 
uninspiring one might think. But perhaps, as Wittgenstein suggests, the virtues of 
clarity, demystification and truth should be found satisfying enough.” 
 
Horwich is first rate and his work well worth the effort. One hopes that he (and 
everyone) will study Searle and some modern psychology as well as Hutto, Read, 
Hutchinson, Stern, Moyal-Sharrock, Stroll, Hacker and Baker etc. to attain a broad 
modern view of behavior. Most of their papers are on academia.edu but for PMS 
Hacker see      http://info.sjc.ox.ac.uk/scr/hacker/DownloadPapers.html. 
 
Finally, let me suggest that with the perspective I have encouraged here, W is at the 
center of contemporary philosophy and psychology and is not obscure, difficult or 
irrelevant, but scintillating, profound and crystal clear and that to miss him is to 
miss one of the greatest intellectual adventures possible. 
 
 
 
